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Legitimizing Corruption in Government: 
Security Votes in Nigeria 
 
Abstract 
 
A concept that is increasingly gaining currency (and notoriety) in Nigeria’s 
budgeting and governance system is the practice of setting aside huge sums of 
money, under the guise of enhancing state security, as security votes. This paper 
investigates the history and practice of the use of security votes in Nigeria. It 
argues that the growing abuse of security votes across all tiers of government in 
the country has been facilitated by the structure of government in place in the 
country. Since independence, Nigeria has been governed by autocratic or partially 
democratic regimes. This, which to some extent has been influenced by the 
country’s colonial heritage and its emergence as a rentier state dependent mainly 
on oil revenue, has not augured well for the development of the culture of 
accountability among its political class. Corruption of governance has also 
impeded the ability of its citizens to call their rulers to order even in the current 
democratic dispensation. 
 
Introduction  
 
A concept that is increasingly gaining currency (and notoriety) in Nigeria’s budgeting 
and governance system is the practice of setting aside huge sums of money, under the 
guise of enhancing state security, as security votes. Recently, for instance, Ebitu 
Ukiwe, a retired air commodore and former Chief of General Staff (number two man) 
in the Government of General Ibrahim Babangida asserted that “the amounts 
mentioned as security votes these days … [are] outrageous and subject to abuses since 
nobody accounts for them.”1 Such abuses are no doubt widespread and range from 
outright misappropriation of such security votes for personal gains to the financing of 
all forms of social ills in the community for political gains. Along these lines, for 
instance, it has been asserted thus:  
 
The tendency among Nigerian politicians, particularly the executive arm at the 
various levels of government, to manipulate security issues for political and 
economic gains is widespread. This has been fuelled by the abuse of security 
votes, an ‘opaque fund’ reserved for the executive which is not appropriated, 
accounted for or audited through the legislature. Sometimes, a state governor 
                                                 
1 See Vanguard [Nigeria] Newspaper, June 8, 2006.  
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could (mis)appropriate as much as N100 million monthly as ‘security vote’. Such 
slush funds are channeled into the secret funding of militias and gangs of 
government ‘enforcers’. Many political office holders have been accused of 
eliminating political opponents through such gangs, including the high-profile 
killing of former minister of justice, Chief Bola Ige.2 
 
 
Despite the alarming increase in the practice, use and abuse of security votes in 
Nigeria, there has been few research studies aimed at enhancing our understanding of 
the underlying forces that have helped shape the emergence and structure of this 
growing phenomenon in government budgeting and expenditure in Nigeria.  
 
This paper investigates the history and practice of the use of security votes in Nigeria. 
It argues that the growing misuse and abuse of security votes, across all tiers of 
government in the country, has to some extent been facilitated by the structure of 
government in place: democracy, partial democracy3 or autocracy (military regime). It 
has, for instance, been argued that democratic regimes are usually less corrupt than 
autocratic regimes. This is so because the electoral mechanism that requires periodic 
renewal of mandate inhibits politicians from engaging in corrupt acts.4 On the other 
hand, corruption is higher in partially democratized countries than in dictatorships.5 
The direct consequence of the above is that in both autocracies and partial 
democracies, as has been the case with Nigeria since Independence, the electoral 
mechanism has been rendered ineffective.6 Without control and fear of sanctions, the 
tendency is for the political class to maximize their personal welfare benefits to the 
detriment of the wider society. Under such a situation, the budgeting process remains 
at best a ritual and the political class show very little concern over its 
                                                 
2 See Ibeanu and Momoh (2008, pp.69-70). More recently, Donald Duke, a former governor of Cross 
River State publicly described how governors influence elections with the aid of security votes. See the 
Guardian Newspaper (July 17, 2010).    
 
3 This includes democracies where electoral malpractices are perverse.  
 
4 Drury et al (2006, p.121) and Tavits (2007, p.218).  
 
5 Montinola and Jackman (2002, p.147).   
 
6 There is no doubt that Nigeria still has a partial democracy. Late President YarÁdua, for instance, 
publicly admitted that the process that brought him to power was flawed. Currently, President 
Goodluck Jonathan has consistently maintained that he will ensure that all votes count in the next 
general elections.   
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implementation.7 Such corrupt practices also lead to the decline of the economic and 
social wellbeing of the citizenry.8 It also erodes the legitimacy of the government 
which in turn applies all possible tactics to retain power. In the process, the goal of 
national security, which is to promote the economic development of the nation state9, 
is redefined to mean the exclusive quest for regime security.10 However we define 
national security, it is indisputable that secrecy in its policy formulation and funding 
can be sometimes justified. Unfortunately, such secrecy, especially in its funding 
(security votes) has also become a viable avenue for some political and military rulers 
to legitimize stealing from the public purse.  
 
To achieve its objective, this paper is divided into five sections. Part One explores the 
interrelationship between corruption and governance while Part Two discusses the 
concept of security votes and its origins. Part Three critiques the practice of security 
votes under the military dispensation in Nigeria while Part Four investigates such 
practices under the civilian dispensation. Part Five concludes the paper.  
 
Corruption and Governance  
 
Arguably the most cited definition of corruption is that which defines it as the use of 
public resources for private purposes.11 This has however been criticized on grounds 
that it has been extensively influenced by western doctrines where there is a distinct 
separation between the state and its rulers and their variant economic interests. The 
fact that in some jurisdictions, the distinction between the wealth of the state and its 
rulers is blurred was however not taken into consideration in the construction of the 
above definition.12 This has led to calls for the definition of corruption to be 
broadened to include what has been referred to as the “corruption complex.” 
                                                 
7 See, for instance, the Debate on the 2010 Appropriation Bill in the Senate (Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (2009, pp.2-18).  
 
8 Arinze (2008, p.71).  
 
9 See Ujomu (2000, p.85).   
 
10 See Ujomu (2001, p.251).  
 
11 See Shleifer and Vishny (1993, p.599) and Smith (1971, p.21).   
 
12 Absolute Monarchies like Saudi Arabia, for instance, fall into this category.   
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Proponents of this view argue that the basis of corruption must transcend the 
distinction between the property rights of the state and its rulers and include acts like 
nepotism, misappropriation, influence peddling and insider trading and abuse.13 
 
For our purposes, the above definitional expansion is particularly useful. Although 
Eurocentric and colonial influences ensured that Nigerian laws were directly copied 
from English laws, the fact remains that several pre-colonial Nigerian ethnic groups 
had traditional practices that were not covered by the Anglo-Saxon definition of 
corruption. The problem with an Eurocentric approach to understanding Africa’s past 
is perhaps best brought out by the fundamental difference in how the concept of the 
state, which is usually at the centre of the Anglo-Saxon definition of corruption, was 
constructed in both jurisdictions. This and its impact on our understanding of the 
peculiar circumstances of Africa has been explained thus: 
 
In many parts of Africa, for most of their known history and until only a century 
or so ago, people contrived to live together in recognizable political communities 
without powerful bureaucracies (indeed without literacy in many cases), without 
standing armies, sometimes without a single national language, without cities, 
without modern industry and without that degree of centralized government 
which most people today would probably regard as necessary for the definition of 
a state. It may even be argued that many of the political entities of pre colonial 
Africa which historians have called states, like old Mali and old Kongo, were 
hardly states at all in any modern definition of the word. A Eurocentric 
historiography of Africa has sought to fit events into an inappropriate theoretical 
framework which still obscures our capacity to understand Africa as it really was 
and hence, as it really is.14 
 
Colonization therefore altered the nature and concept of the state in Africa. Prior to 
the advent of colonization, Africa had cultures and practices that developed out of the 
peculiarities of its circumstances which at the time were not seen as corrupt. This was 
especially so given the nature of the state. This was at least in part because Chiefs and 
Kings received no salaries and relied on gifts, booty, tributes and levies for their 
upkeep. There was also practically no distinction between private and public purse.15 
                                                 
13 See, for instance, Sardan (1999, p.27).  
 
14 Ellis (1996, p.10). See also, Fuglestad (1992).  
 
15 Falola (1998, p.142). It has also been asserted that: “Before the advent of the British, the traditional 
rulers were subjected to certain checks and balances by the elders and chiefs and invariably the larger 
community. But this was to drastically change with the protection offered traditional rulers by the 
British, and which oftentimes bestowed on such rulers arbitrary powers”(Agedah, 1993, p.vi).   
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It was, for instance, customary in Ibo land to give gifts as a precursor to making 
demands on community elders.16 
 
Interestingly, such systems had inbuilt mechanisms that helped prevent abuse. This 
was because in many of these jurisdictions, power was concentrated along kinship 
lines and thus based on group loyalty. Such loyalty gave the people some power in 
their relationship with the patriarch of the kin. With some power distributed to the 
people, that concentrated in the hand of the patriarch could not easily be misused.17 
Based on the above, such rulers held office only as long as they pleased their people. 
They were essentially fatherly figures who were chosen for their good character and 
integrity and were thus responsible to the people. They reigned but did not rule.18  
 
The formalization of the state, which was no doubt facilitated by colonization, 
however changed the structure of the agency relationships in the governance of these 
territories. To understand this point, it is important to note that the very essence of 
colonization was to exploit the economic potentials of Africa which had hitherto been 
unexplored.  This has explicitly been explained thus:  
 
Economic exploitation was the purpose of colonization, and force, its method. 
The government was not based on a social contract; It did not receive power from 
the people. Rather, it took power by force. As such, it had no loyalty, no 
responsibility to the Nigerian people. Without the restraints that such loyalty 
provides, the British enjoyed absolute, unrestricted power. They could do as they 
pleased. And they did in many instances. In all of their actions as colonial rulers 
of Nigeria, the British looked after their own interest first and foremost. These 
interests were mostly economic- the transfer of wealth from the colony to the 
homeland. Thus the government did not exist to serve the needs of the Nigerian 
people. It existed to control the Nigerian people and to serve the interest of the 
ruling elites and their mother country.19  
 
                                                 
 
16 See, for instance, Brownsberger (1983, p.222).  
 
17 Clarno and Falola (1998, p.170).   
 
18 Brownsberger (1983, p.223).   
 
19 Clarno and Falola (1998, pp.170-171). It was also similarly asserted that: “Africans regarded 
colonialism as an alien, despotic, and non democratic system designed by the Europeans to help the 
later exploit African resources for the benefit of the metropolitan citizens. Colonial institutions, thus, 
were seen as instruments which the Europeans used in their exploitation of the African peoples and 
their resources” (Mbaku, 1998b, p.150).    
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The formal state became the vehicle for undertaking this task. The state therefore 
instantly became the main beneficiary of the expanded economic activities. 
 
The change in the agency relationships in the colonized territories occurred because 
the colonial powers governed the colonized territories directly or indirectly through 
proxies.20 In a normal agency contract, the citizen (or principal) grants the agent (or 
government) the authority to monopolize the use of legitimate force. In return, the 
agent provides the principal with public goods and services. Under such agency 
agreements, governments are usually allowed to impose coercive activities like taxes. 
The government then uses the resources collected to provide public good such as 
defense and crime control. Corruption becomes evident when the agent, in the 
performance of his duties, sacrifices the interest of his principal for his own.21 Under 
the agency agreements that existed in pre-colonial traditional African settings, the 
power structure ensured that such abuses could be rectified either through reprimand 
or removal of the agent. Policing the agent in a colonial setting was however riddled 
with structural difficulties. In the very first place, the mandate of the principal had 
been stolen from the public by the colonial power, with the aid of superior force. The 
colonial power then appoints any party as the agent to hold and use such mandate on 
its behalf. Under such scenario the principal loses all powers to police and control the 
agent. This distortion also affects the relationship of the colonial master and his self 
appointed agent. This is so because the colonial power, by the nature and objective of 
his intrusion, has lost considerable moral authority to hold his agent accountable. 
Under such a scenario, keeping their agents happy by allowing them some degree of 
corruption becomes an integral part of sustaining the colonial regime. Colonization 
also entrenched the belief among agents that government was for the governors, not 
the governed.22  
 
From the above, it is clear that corruption and the nature of governance in Nigeria 
have been historically entwined. This, to a great extent, corroborates the point that the 
                                                 
 
20 For a summary of the debate on the distinction between direct and indirect rule, see Lange (2004, 
pp.906-908).    
 
21 Mbaku (1998a, p.33). 
 
22 Clarno and Falola (1998, p.173).   
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nature of governance in place do impact on the level of corruption, which has been 
earlier made. Given the relationship between corruption and the nature of governance, 
it can be argued that unsanctioned corruption in Nigeria had its origins in the 
emergence of colonization. The fact that the British colonial rule essentially provided 
arbitrary powers to their African collaborators, which has already been discussed, was 
no doubt a contributory factor to the above problem. Colonization, which essentially 
ensured that some groups that had dissimilar cultures and religion were brought 
together under a central government also ensured the emergence of ethnic divide and 
rivalries even in post independence Nigeria.23 This, till date, has remained a major 
impediment in the fight against corruption. The oil boom, which led to the over 
expansion of the public sector and elevated the struggle for the control of its vast 
revenue to a national sport also complicated the ‘corruption complex’ of the 
country.24 The result of all the above influences is that what should normally be a 
straight forward agency agreement has been extensively muddled up. Corruption has 
therefore remained an intractable problem. It is therefore not surprising that since 
Independence, most military change of government (and in one occasion, refusal to 
hand over power to civilians) have been based on the need to eradicate corruption.  
 
In the January 1966 military coup, for instance, the Coup leader, Major Chukwuma 
Nzeogwu made it explicit that the “aim of the Revolutionary Council is to establish a 
strong united and prosperous nation, free from corruption and internal strife .“25 The 
Nzeogwu group was unable to consolidate power and the military high command 
under General Aguiyi Ironsi, was invited to form the Government. Corruption was 
again at the centre of his maiden address to the nation on January 28, 1966.26 This 
Government was overthrown six months later and Yakubu Gowon became the new 
Head of State. The ethnic rivalries that played out in the January and July 1966 
military coups culminated in the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970).27 Gowon also 
                                                 
 
23 Dagne  (2006, p.1).  
 
24 See Herbst (1993, pp.157-8).  
 
25 Nzeogwu (1966).  
 
26 See Agedah (1993, pp.13-14).   
 
27 For a recent analysis of the factors that led to the war and its eventual outcome see Uche (2008).   
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admitted the prevalence of corruption during his regime and ironically listed its 
elimination as a condition to be achieved before handing over power to the civilians.28 
Gowon was overthrown by General Murtala Muhammed in July 1975. The 
Government of Murtala Muhammed which came to power in July 1975 found all but 
two of the twelve state governors under the Gowon regime to have illegally exploited 
their offices and amassed personal wealth.29 General Obasabjo, who took over after 
the assassination of Muhammed in an unsuccessful military coup in February 1976, 
subsequently handed over power to a Civilian Government led by Shehu Shagari in 
October 1979.  
 
When the Shagari Government was overthrown on December 31, 1983, Corruption 
was again identified as the main causative factor.30 When General Babangida 
overthrew Buhari in August 1985, in a palace coup, he again frowned at the 
corruption record of Shagari asserting that the “history of our nation had never 
recorded the degree of indiscipline and corruption as in the period between October 
1979 and December 1983.”31 Ironically, Babangida went ahead to preside over an 
arguably more corrupt government than Shagari.32 It has for instance been suggested 
that his regime “marked a transformation in Nigeria’s already notorious corruption, 
turning it into a generalised instrument of government.”33 The weak budgeting 
structure in the country no doubt facilitated corruption. A World Bank report, for 
instance, noted that “significant domestic currency spending appears to have occurred 
without any apparent budgetary authorisation.’’ More serious was the fact that “some 
$1 billion equivalent of revenues was allocated under ill defined and poorly 
documented procedures outside the usual accounting framework.”34  
 
                                                 
 
28  See Forrest (1993, p.55).  
 
29 See Forrest (1993, p.56). 
 
30 See Agedah (1993, p.23).  
 
31 Babangida (1985).  
 
32 See, for instance, Peters (1997, pp. 213-4) and Oko-osi (2007, p.8). 
 
33 Ellis (2009, p.179).  
 
34 Quoted in Oko-osi, 2007, p.19 
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General Babangida, after annulling the 1993 Presidential elections, was forced to hand 
over power to an interim National Government headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan. In 
his three months reign, Shonekan also acknowledged the hydra headed nature of 
corruption in the country.35 
 
He was succeeded by General Sani Abacha who also ran a very corrupt Government. 
Evidence of the acquiescence of Nigerian Government to corruption was perhaps best 
demonstrated by the agreement the subsequent democratic government president, 
Olusegun Obasanjo signed with the family of General Sani Abacha with respect to the 
billions of dollars Abacha looted. According to the New York Times of April 18, 
2002:  
 
The family of the late Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha, who has been accused of 
looting national assets during his military rule, will return $1 billion to Nigeria, 
the Swiss government said today. The out-of-court arrangement allows the family 
to keep $100 million, which the Swiss Federal Office of Justice described as 
funds ''acquired prior to Abacha's term in office and which, according to Nigerian 
authorities, demonstrably do not derive from criminal acts.'' The settlement also 
requires the Nigerian government to drop some criminal charges against Mr. 
Abacha's son, Muhammad Sani Abacha, and an associate, Bagudu Abubakar. 
Nigeria had been seeking to recover as much as $4 billion from Abacha accounts 
in various European banks. Part of the settlement money will come from 
Switzerland, which said it would turn over $535 million to the Bank for 
International Settlements in Basel for Nigeria's use. Other banks that have 
Abacha accounts -- in Britain, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein and Jersey, in the 
Channel Islands -- are expected to detail their shares of the settlement soon.36  
Given the fact that Nigeria has witnessed only military regimes and partial 
democracies since independence, it is not surprising that the country has consistently 
experienced very high levels of corruption. The rentier nature of the Nigerian state, 
facilitated mainly by its oil wealth, has increased the desperation by various 
stakeholders to control the machinery of the state.37 Arguably because of the above, 
the pressures for change in the ‘corruption complex’ of the country have come mostly 
from the outside. This is mainly because of two interrelated reasons. First, it is 
                                                 
35 See Herbst (1996, p.158). 
 
36 The New York Times, April 18, 2002. See also (Dagne, 2006, p.6). It was later reported that the 
Abacha family subsequently reneged and refused to sign the agreement (GTZ, 2007). In recent times, it 
has been widely reported that the son of the late dictator: Mohammed Abacha will run for the 
governorship position in his native Kano State (see Leadership Newspaper, August 23, 2010).  
 
37 For a detailed analysis of this point see Uche and Uche (2004).   
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generally believed that corruption is negatively correlated with the level of integration 
of a country with the international community. In other words, the more a country is 
entwined with the international economy, the less corrupt it will be.38 While this may 
be true, it is important to note that this has not always been so. This is because the 
efficacy of the above theory is correlated with the rise in strict governance and ethical 
standards which has a recent origin. In fact, and this is the second point, it was not 
until recently that international agencies like the World Bank began to insist on 
increasingly strict international business and ethical standards across the world.39 
With multinational corporations coming under pressure from their home states, the 
power of local beneficiaries of corruption to control the evidence of their corruption 
has been greatly whittled down. In recent times, for instance, corrupt practices in 
Nigeria has been exposed not so much because of the efficiency of law enforcements 
officers in Nigeria but because their bribers are increasingly being nabbed in their 
home countries. Most high profile Nigerian bribery scandals like those relating to 
Halliburton, Jefferson, Daimler and Siemens fit this bill.40  
Based on the above, it is clear that change is imminent. Unfortunately, the very people 
called upon to make the structural changes necessary to limit opportunities for 
corruption are the very actors who benefit most from the status quo.41 The 
consequence of this is that such officials are now tinkering with local rules and 
regulations to see the possibility of still accommodating their individual interests at 
the expense of the state, but in a way that will be less entwined with the international 
community. One way corruption has been legitimized in the past in Nigeria is by 
systematically legalizing bribery. This is the case with section 287(3) of the Nigerian 
Companies and Allied Matters Act of 1990 which allows directors to receive and keep 
“unsolicited gift” from beneficiaries of the company “as a sign of gratitude” so long 
as he/ she declares it to the board.42 This, interestingly, can be ‘justified’ on grounds 
                                                 
 
38 See Sandholtz and Gray (2003, p. 761).  
 
39 See, for instance, Tavits (2007, p.73).   
 
40 See Elombah (2010b).   
 
41 Lawson (2009, p. 74).  
 
42 See Ogowewo (2009, p.6).  
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of our cultural heritage. Another veritable vehicle for doing this is by creating a black 
box around the concept of security votes on the pretense that absolute secrecy is 
required in the allocation and spending of such votes for security reasons. The origins 
and meaning of security votes and how it has been used in Nigeria will be explored in 
the subsequent sections.   
 
the Idea of Security Votes 
 
A convenient starting point for our understanding of the concept of security vote, 
which encompasses the process for setting aside money for national security and 
operationalising such expenses, will be to define the concept of national security. 
Unfortunately, this is not an easy concept to define. This is because the overriding 
objective of any state is to ensure its survival and achieving this sometimes requires 
behavior that goes against the interest of other legitimate entities. National interest is 
in most cases the guiding principle in determining the security needs of any state.43  
 
It is on the basis of the above that an important security study commissioned by the 
Canadian Police made explicit the amorphous nature of the concept of national 
security thus: 
 
1 do not know what national security means. But then, neither does the 
government. The Solicitor General stated in early June, 1978, before the House 
of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs: “There is no 
definition of the term ‘national security’ because in effect national security is 
basically a term that refers to protection of sovereignty, and activities related to 
the protection of sovereignty.” It is one of those terms after which one should add 
the phrase “whatever that means.” Some view the concept as one that they cannot 
define, but, like obscenity, they know it when they see it. This was the view of 
the U.K. Committee of Privy Counselors on Ministerial Memoirs, which in 1976 
stated: “National security is a vague enough idea in the conditions of the modern 
world and its subjects range much further afield than the simpler categories of 
earlier days, such as the plans of fortresses or the designs of warships or 
aeroplanes. Nevertheless, experience has shown that, when it comes 
to a practical issue turning on a particular set of facts, it is not usually difficult to 
agree whether they fall within or without the security net.44 
                                                 
43 It has, for instance, been argued that national interest: “is not a detached interest in our international 
environment pursued for its own sake, independent of our aspirations and problems here at home. It 
does not signify things we would like to see happen in the outside world primarily for the sake of the 
outside world.... It is a function of our duty to ourselves in our democratic problems... to assure that we 
should be permitted, as a people, to continue our Pilgrim's progress toward a better America under the 
most favourable conditions” (Quoted in Nincic, 1999, p.37).  
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Based on the above, it is not surprising that the funding of security matters also 
exhibit some of the characteristics of national security itself. Given the sometimes 
sensitive nature of security, nation states have historically considered it undesirable to 
debate and agree security matters (and its funding) in the global public space. The 
usual argument for toeing this line is that such disclosures may endanger national 
security.45  
 
The essence of secrecy in security matters including its design, funding and 
implementation have been defended on the basis of the following needs:  
 
• To accommodate “plausible deniability” 
 
• To provide “cover” for operations  
 
• To elicit cooperation from national intelligence agencies in other countries  
 
• To facilitate counterintelligence and counterespionage activities.46  
 
Historically, secrecy in dealing with national security issues dates back to the 
emergence of the modern nation state. In the United States, for instance, there is 
evidence of such practices in the nineteenth century. Interestingly Congress 
participated in the design, funding and operationalisation of some of these national 
security issues at the time. It has, for instance, been asserted that:  
 
Congress is not without some past experience in clandestine legislative 
performance and lawmaking. In 1811, during the third session of the 11th 
Congress, two statutes and a joint resolution pertaining to Florida, which was 
then under Spanish rule, were enacted by both Houses in secret session, approved 
covertly by President Madison, and not published until 1818. Congress also has a 
long history of confidential funding-burying lump sums of money in an 
appropriation and allowing agencies to use certificates rather than vouchers for 
the expenditure of such funds. A memorable example of this kind of financial 
arrangement is the Manhattan Project, which developed and produced the atomic 
bomb.47  
                                                                                                                                            
44 Quoted in Relyea (1987, p.12) 
 
45 See, Goldberg (1987, p.44). 
 
46 Gibson (1987, p.29). 
 
47 Relyea (1988, p.111).  
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The Second World War and the emergence of the cold war, however took state covert 
security operations to a new level. In the United States for instance, the enactment of 
the National Security Act of 1947, whose principal mission was the preservation and 
perpetuation of the nation by any and all means… [and] its primary characteristic was 
secrecy” set the stage for the rise of the national security state.48 This became the 
basis for the subsequent establishment of the various security apparatus including the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and the 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).49 The functions of some of these agencies and 
their funding mechanism were also as secretive as their existence. This also created 
the enabling environment for American Presidents to acquire enormous presidential 
powers and discretion in issues of national security. It was under these circumstances 
that President Truman, in 1951 issued Executive Order 10290 which introduced 
sweeping changes that further enhanced the secretive nature of state security and the 
powers of the presidency therein. Along these lines, it has been asserted that:  
 
E.O. 10290 of September 24, 1951, introduced three sweeping innovations in 
security classification policy. First, the order indicated [that] the Chief Executive 
was relying upon “the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes, 
and as President of the United States” in issuing the directive. This formula 
appeared to strengthen the President’s discretion to make official secrecy policy: 
it intertwined his responsibility as Commander in Chief with the constitutional 
obligation to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” Second, information 
was now classified in the interest of “national security,” a somewhat new, but 
nebulous, concept, which, in the view of some, conveyed more latitude for the 
creation of official secrets. It replaced the heretofore relied upon “national 
defense” standard for classification. Third, the order extended classification 
authority to nonmilitary entities, to be exercised by, presumably, but not 
explicitly limited to, those having some role in “national security” policy.50 
 
Over time, however, evidence of abuse and concerns about the utility value of the 
covert operations of the various agencies led Congress to increasingly demand that its 
oversight function be enforced.51 The consequence of the above was the establishment 
in both houses of congress of an Intelligence Committee with the responsibility to: 
                                                 
48 Relyea (1988, p.106).  
 
49 Deutch and Smith (2002, p.64).  
 
50 Relyea (2003, p.399). 
 
51 For examples of CIA excesses, see Stockwell (1979).   
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develop new charter legislation for the intelligence agencies; review their 
administrative guidelines; study their bids for annual funding; examine the managerial 
soundness of new structural arrangements; evaluate intelligence results and the 
integrity of the methods behind them; appraise hardware innovations to determine 
which machines collect the most intelligence for the least cost; and, serve as an ear for 
whistleblowers.52   
 
The security impact of the Cold War however extended beyond the two principal 
players: America and the USSR. This was so because several developing countries 
emerged as proxy states for the super powers. Such associations no doubt helped 
promote corruption in these African states.53 For the superpowers,  at least during the 
cold war era, loyalty was prized above prudence in their support for clientelist African 
leaders. Under the above scenario, heavy investment in arms and security became an 
important component in the bid by corrupt African governments to retain power. In an 
ideologically divided world, it was both strategic and prudent for most nation states to 
maintain high level secrecy in the design and funding of their national security plans. 
In order to achieve the above, it has been theorized that these nation states have in the 
past adopted four main strategies which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. These 
include:  
 
• Double bookkeeping: This involves keeping two sets of accounts. The 
published accounts and the real accounts. While the published account is for 
public consumption, the real account, which is more accurate, is purely for 
internal government consumption.  
 
• Extra budgetary accounts: This involves creating revenue sources for security 
funding which is not included in the national budget. An example of this kind 
of arrangement can be found in Indonesia where such security fundings is 
                                                 
 
52 According to the CIA Director at the time: Stansfield Turner, “Oversight can be a bureaucratic 
impediment and a risk to security. It can also be a tremendous strength and benefit to us. It shares our 
responsibilities. It ensures against our becoming separated from the legal and ethical standards of our 
society. It prevents disharmony between our foreign policy and intelligence efforts. It helps us build a 
solid foundation for the future of our intelligence operations” (See Johnson, 1980, pp. 479 and 494).    
 
53 Ellis (1996, p.15).  
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financed by a special military fund derived from the earnings of the country’s 
numerous military linked enterprises. 
 
• Highly aggregated budget categories: Under this scenario, countries simply 
provide a single figure for their entire security budget. Sometimes such 
security expenditure is disaggregated in a very limited way which is usually 
not very useful to the general public. Such figures, in reality, normally 
represent a fraction of their actual security budget.  
 
• Foreign Exchange Manipulation: Under this scenario, part of the foreign 
exchange earned by the state from the sale of products abroad, usually raw 
materials, is not recorded in government accounts and is not repatriated. Such 
funds can then be used to address all manner of security issues including the 
purchase of military equipments. India, in 1980, used this mechanism to 
purchase Soviet arms.54   
 
In the next two sections, we will explore the practice of security votes in Nigeria 
under various military and civilian administrations.  
 
 Practice of Security Votes in Nigeria Under the Military 
Dispensation  
 
In the last section, we demonstrated the basis for the general secrecy surrounding the 
concept of security votes around the world. In the light of the above, it is not 
surprising that Nigeria, in adopting the security vote concept has also retained some 
degree of secrecy in its methodology, allocation and use. Because of the secrecy 
surrounding this expenditure, information about it is hard to come by. The implication 
of this is that it will be difficult to empirically validate any of the four methodologies 
used in disguising security expenses as theorized in the preceding section. Despite 
this, we know that during past military regimes in the country, large scale abuse of the 
system occurred only at the very top of the leadership hierarchy. This was essentially 
because of the centralized nature of military governments.  
 
                                                 
54 Ball (1984, pp. 158-161).  
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Publicly available evidence on this secretive security vote practice suggests that large 
scale abuse of such security votes commenced under the military regime of General 
Babangida. Along these lines, it has been asserted that:  
Babangida was ruthless in the way he amassed his colossal wealth.  First is the 
illegal self-allocation of free oil, sold on the spot market. Then he initiated the 
corrupt culture of maintaining a huge monthly security vote virtually as personal 
pocket money.55 
 
The level of corruption in the regime no doubt fuelled insecurity and raised numerous 
challenges to the legitimacy of the regime.56 This in turn encouraged the regime to 
devise various mechanisms, ranging from disbursing of favours to opponents of the 
regime to outright repression of opposition all at great costs to the state. Under such 
circumstances, national security was misconstrued and misdirected to imply the 
exclusive quest for regime security and the personal security of the regime leadership 
and their cronies. Along these lines, it has been asserted thus:  
 
Thus central to the vitiation of national security, the economy and resource 
management during [the] Babangida regime was the widespread use of political 
manipulation, repressive tactics and the disbursing of favours and public 
patronage… There was increasing civil strife, anti government protests and 
public disaffection within the country, most of which could be linked to the 
effects of economic hardship on the citizens. Babangida exhibited a high level of 
obsession with wealth and power and he sought to manipulate political forces in 
order to perpetuate himself in office. He practiced a cynical and corrupt style of 
governance and also concentrated so much authoritarian power in his own hands. 
He used the State Security Service (SSS) as a tool of terror. In addition, he 
created a national guard that would operate independently of the Nigerian armed 
forces and answerable only to himself.57 
 
The financial recklessness of the Babangida administration was not in doubt. The 
Okigbo Panel set up to investigate the activities of the Central bank of Nigeria in 1994 
reported that during his regime, 12.2 billion dollars was diverted to off budget 
accounts thus making proper accountability almost impossible.58 During the period, 
there was also little respect for the budget. Olashore, a one time Secretary of Finance 
                                                 
 
55 Osahon (2010).  
 
56 Arinze (2008, p.72).   
 
57 Ujomu (2000, p.91).  
 
58  Ujomu (2000, p.91). 
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and Economic Development under Babangida, once asserted that during his tenure, he 
experienced a never ending pressure from a variety of interest groups, who tried to 
intimidate and blackmail the controlling agencies to release funds. Such persons 
carried on as if the budget document was irrelevant to what they were doing.59  
 
Despite the widespread corruption under the Babangida regime, the centralized nature 
of military administrations ensured that the abuse of security votes was limited to the 
top hierarchy of the administration. Another explanation for this was that given the 
centralized structure of military administrations, local specificities about security were 
limited. Arguably because of the above reasons, state governors under the Babangida 
regime were therefore subjected to a strict regime in their use of security votes. In this 
direction Ebitu Ukiwe recently asserted that as Chief of General Staff, he was in 
charge of what the state governors did with their security votes which was limited to 
N10,000.00 per month. This was the money they used to monitor the security 
situation in their states. They were not expected to account for it. “In exceptional 
cases, they could spend N15,000[.00], but must account for it."60  
 
In 1993, General Abacha overthrew the Shonekan interim government and continued 
with the Babangida legacy in the abuse of security votes. Understandably, General 
Abacha who was the Chief of Army Staff under General Babangida, had acquired 
considerable experience in the abuse of security votes during that dispensation. Under 
Babangida, for instance, it was reported that it was not unusual for government 
cheques, running into tens of millions of dollars, for the purchase of arms and 
ammunition for the armed forces to be written in his (Abacha’s) personal name. One 
cheque “said to have been for $75 million, was intended to fund weapons 
procurement for Nigerian troops stationed in Liberia with little or nothing ever 
arriving.”61 When he became President therefore, it was business as usual. Given the 
secretive nature of security votes, very little was known about his escapades in this 
                                                 
59 Quoted in Herbst (1996, p.161). It was therefore not surprising that for the 1991 fiscal year, during 
the Bababguida regime, the Government intended a modest N100 million budget surplus. Half way 
through the fiscal year however, the Government had incurred a deficit of N19 billion (Olaloku, 1994, 
p.183). This poor budget implementation record has remained till date. 
 
60 Vanguard, June 8, 2006.  
 
61 Baker (2005, p.60) 
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arena until after his death in 1998. In one of the posthumous probe panels set up to 
investigate the activities of his administration, it was noted that: 
 
Peter Gana, an Assistant Commissioner of the Nigerian Police, for example, was 
able to point to some of the methods used by Abacha to extract cash from the 
Government. In particular, he cited what has become known as the Security Vote 
Monies method. It was used by Abacha together with Alhaji Ismaila Gwarzo, his 
former National Security Adviser. Gwarzo would write letters to Abacha 
requesting payment of sums of money to meet “urgent” national security needs. 
Around 30 of these letters were written over a three-year period from 1995 to 
1998. The sums requested started at around $0.8 million and progressively 
increased – the highest was around $200 million. The Central Bank was then 
constrained by order of the Head of State to make available huge sums in cash or 
by way of transfer through the banking system. The monies extracted from the 
Central Bank amounted to nearly $2 billion.62  
 
His successor, General Abdulsalami Abubakar whose rule lasted for less than one 
year focused mainly on transiting the country to a civilian regime. There is little 
available information about his security vote practices. What is however known is that 
his regime was blighted by the speed with which it depleted the country’s national 
reserves from $7.1 billion to $3.1 billion within the short period he was in office 
without any infrastructural development to show for it.63   
 
In the next section, we will explore the law and practice of security votes in the 
current fourth republic which commenced on May 29, 1999.  
 
Practice of Security Votes in Nigeria Under the Civilian Dispensation    
 
As part of the transition to civilian rule, the military administration of General 
Abubakar promulgated the 1999 Constitution. Section 14 (2b) of the said constitution 
                                                 
62 GTZ (2007). See also Ujomu (2000, p, 92). On another occasion, it was reported that: ‘Between 
November 1993 and June 1998, Abacha directed his National Security Adviser, Alhaji Ismail Gwarzo 
to withdraw from the Central Bank of Nigeria a total of $1.6 Billion and £417 million for security 
purposes. Interestingly, only £250,000 and $195 million went for that purpose. Sani Abacha with the 
help of Bagudu diverted the rest to foreign accounts. On Wednesday September 20 2000, Ismail 
Gwarzo, appearing before a Swiss investigative panel, at one of the offices of the National Security 
Adviser, on 24 Mambilla Street, Aso Drive, Abuja offered to release to the government the sum of 
$500 million. Before the September 20, 2000 promise, Gwarzo had refunded $250 million and $135 
million to the Abdusalami Abubakar government. Abacha's former Minister, Anthony Ani also claimed 
that Abacha gave him a gift of DM 30 million for being a loyal Minister, "I accepted the gift in 
accordance with my wife's advice," Chief Ani said’ (Oduyela, 2004).  
63 Newswatch Magazine, 29 September 2010.  
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makes it explicit that the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary 
purpose of government.” The second schedule of the constitution also makes the 
federal government to be exclusively responsible for the security of the country. The 
police, armed forces and border control are exclusively the responsibility of the 
Federal Government. Within the Federal Government, the Constitution conveys on 
the President (executive) the powers to “cause to be prepared and laid before each 
House of the National Assembly at any time in each financial year estimates of the 
revenues and expenditure of the Federation for the next following financial year.”64 
Section 85 of the Constitution also requires that the accounts of all offices of the 
Federation shall be audited by the Auditor-General who shall submit his reports to the 
National Assembly. The implication of the above provisions is that the legislative arm 
of government has been given oversight function over the entire process of budgeting 
and its implementation. This has sometimes become an area of dispute between the 
executive and the legislature.65 It has, as will be argued later, also given the 
legislature a major bargaining chip in the politics of revenue allocation in Nigeria at 
all levels of government.  
                                                
 
As has already been noted, the issue of national security is exclusively the 
responsibility of the Federal Government under the current political dispensation. In 
undertaking the above function, the government routinely allocates funds to all the 
relevant security agencies under its control. Aside from the above, it, like the military 
administrations before it, also set aside substantial sums yearly as security vote. 
Although the allocation and expenditure under this heading is usually shrouded in 
 
64 Section 81.  
 
65  It has, for instance, been asserted that: “Soon after the new constitutional framework came into 
effect, it was thrown into the spotlight during a dispute between the president and the National 
Assembly that caused a four-month delay in the passing of the federal budget for the 2000 fiscal year. 
The conflict revealed that the executive and legislative branches of government were actively engaging 
with, and testing, their respective powers and roles in budgetary matters under the new constitution. As 
President Olusegun Obasanjo remarked: “It was perhaps to be expected that at the beginning of our 
search for the meaning and form of a true republican democracy, mistakes would be made, and extreme 
positions would be taken by those involved in this search”.[1] The National Assembly, on the other 
hand, has insisted that its input is desirable to match the budget more closely with developmental 
needs.[2] Moreover, the National Assembly claimed that the executive implemented a mere 30 per cent 
of the 2000 budget, a figure the federal government put at 64 per cent.[3] Despite hopes that the 
executive and legislative branches would be able to restore a cordial relationship, the budget process 
continues to attract controversy” (Wehner, 2002, p.216). 
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secrecy, the public sometimes get a rare glimpse into the mechanics of this fund when 
there is a dispute within the ruling class.  
 
During the regime of President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007), it was speculated 
that he was likely to try to force through the constitutional amendment that would 
allow him contest for the presidency a third time with the aid of the security vote.66 It 
was only recently, after Obasanjo stirred the hornets nest by publicly asserting that 
legislators are corrupt and overpaid that some of the secrets regarding some of his 
dealings with the legislature during his administration were made available to the 
public.67  
 
Obasanjo’s public comments instantly ignited angry responses from legislators who 
accused him of bribing them to actualise his botched third term bid. The interesting 
position of Mohammed Ndume, the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives 
on this matter was reported in a national daily thus:  
In a rare display of frankness…, [he] acknowledged former president, Olusegun 
Obasanjo's charge that lawmakers are corrupt, but questioned Mr Obasanjo's 
basis for blaming legislators, who often have "justified" reasons to pilfer…. [H]e 
rebuked the former president's claim that federal lawmakers maintain 
questionable earnings and frequently pad national budgets sent to them for 
approval. He said while he does not totally disagree with Mr Obasanjo, he would 
have favoured such allegations to be extended to "Nigeria or politicians" in 
general. "To single the legislature out," he said, "I think he is not being fair." 
Again, even where the lawmakers are corrupt, Mr Ndume said, they have more 
"legitimate reasons", and Mr Obasanjo is least qualified to question that. "Is it not 
Obasanjo who bred corruption in this country? It was during his tenure that 
corruption moved from low level to high level. It was during his tenure that he 
gave N50 million each to members of this House to extend his tenure," he said. 
                                                 
66 See Akinnaso (2006).  
67 Specifically, Obasanjo stated thus: “We should look closely at the legislature so that they can be 
more open and transparent in the way they do their work. Nobody knows in detail how much it costs us 
to maintain a senator. I believe it is more than N250 Million. Compare what it cost in 1999 and 2000, it 
cost about $1.7 Million. “Compare to a quarter of a million in America. You must understand the 
power of each of us have, they came up and say something is constituency project, what is this 
constituency project? “They insert it in the budget, they would find the contractor and the contractor 
would work for them, that is constituency project? They then accuse some people of corruption, who 
are not corrupt. “Now let us talk truly to ourselves seriously. We can’t continue to have a National 
Assembly that is consuming a disproportional part of our resources and then expect that we would be 
able to make progress. They pass budget that can’t be implemented, because it has to be beefed up to 
satisfy their whims and caprices. Even what the ministries did not ask for they put it” (quoted in The 
Nigerian Inquirer, August 6, 2010). 
 23
"Go and look at his account when he came out the prison to become the president 
and look at his account now. That will answer who is corrupt.68 
It is no doubt such impunity that keeps Nigeria’s status as one of the most corrupt 
countries in the world alive. “The country’s image as a bastion for bribery, venality 
and deceit has [no doubt] remained consistent over the years.”69 
Under the late President YarÁdua, the abuse of security votes also continued 
unabated. Again, it was the difficult transition from the then ill President to his 
deputy: Goodluck Jonathan that brought such abuses to the public domain. In March 
2010, for instance, shortly after President Jonathan was confirmed as Acting President 
by the National Assembly, a national newspaper reported that his administration may 
have commenced a discreet investigation into how billions of Naira earmarked as 
“security vote” disappeared without proper authorization and under questionable 
circumstances between November 2009 and February 2010. This was the period when 
the then President was receiving treatment in Saudi Arabia. Specifically, it was 
alleged that a few individuals within the President’s inner circle were responsible for 
this security vote malpractice. The money was feared to have been stashed away in 
foreign bank accounts in Mauritius, Saudi Arabia and Isle of Man.70  
The exact amount involved in this security vote malpractice was later revealed by 
another national daily to be N70 billion. The paper further disclosed that “when the 
arrowheads of the cabal were interrogated, they confessed to spending the money but 
disclosed that most of … [it] was used for lobbying prominent Nigerians.” The 
investigation was however mellowed due to the intervention of “powerful forces who 
told Jonathan that his becoming President was made possible because of the 
cooperation of some of the persons he was investigating.”71 
At the state level, although governors have no responsibility over the security 
apparatus of the country, the Constitution recognises the State Governors as Chief 
Security Officers of their respective states. This has no doubt sometimes led to crisis 
                                                 
68 Next Newspaper, August 6, 2010.  
 
69 Smith (2007, p.1).   
 
70 The Punch newspaper, March 27, 2010.  
 
71 See Vanguard Newspaper, July 16, 2010.   
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in apportioning both responsibility and blame in the event of security breaches. 
During a recent sectarian crisis in Jos, Plateau State for instance, the Governor of the 
State publicly claimed that he could do little to intervene since he was not in control 
of the security apparatus. It is based on the above that he demanded that the 
Constitution be amended to give governors more powers over security matters. 
According to him:  
 
The fundamental issue of security, as I have always said, is the responsibility of 
the Federal Government. I am now advocating that the National Assembly, now 
that they are reviewing the constitution, should see how state governors, the chief 
security officers of their states, can be given such powers that they can use the 
police to immediately stop certain things that could escalate, if not nipped in the 
bud. I believe that we should discuss with the Federal Government to ensure that 
the police is properly used in situations like this… The fear always is that the 
governors will misuse security. Governors are trusted by their people, that is why 
they are elected as chief executives of their states, if the people don’t trust them, 
they won’t elect them.72  
Despite the above, various state governments have reacted in different manner to the 
increasing insecurity in their states and its attendant problems. Lagos State, for 
instance, has in collaboration with the big businesses in its territory set up a security 
trust fund. An example of the activities of this trust fund was aptly summarised by the 
State Governor in his recent budget speech thus:  
 
The Lagos State Security Trust Fund continued to wax stronger as we donated 10 
armoured personnel carriers, 1000 AK 47 rifles and 2 million rounds of 
ammunition to enhance the crime–fighting capacity of the rapid response squad 
in addition to financially rewarding police officers who demonstrated uncommon 
courage on duty. In the same vein, we donated twelve operational vehicles to the 
Nigerian Prison Service to assist in the speedy dispensation of justice in Lagos 
State.73 
 
Most other states have also donated equipments to the Police Force. The implication 
of the above is that many state governments are actually performing security 
operations despite the fact that this is constitutionally a federal responsibility.  
 
                                                 
 
72 Quoted in the Punch Newspaper, March  31, 2010. 
 
73 Fashola (2009).  
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It is under this cover that some state governors and their associates may have been 
hiding to steal huge sums of money from their states. Given that their budgets are also 
required to go to their various state houses of assembly for ratification, it can be 
logically assumed that such approvals are almost always given in horse trading 
sessions in which the executive may also be required to allocate generous allowances 
to the legislature in order to make the approval of such huge and indefensible security 
votes worth their while. This may, at least in part, explain why Nigerian legislators are 
among the best paid in the world.74  
 
The secrecy surrounding issues of national security and the nature of security votes 
normally provide an alibi for state administrators in their attempt to evade allegations 
of corruption. A recent case is that of Bayelsa State which has come under 
investigative scrutiny for all manner of fraud and embezzlement by top Government 
officials in the state. One example within the state has aptly been documented thus:  
The use of security votes offers a virtual carte blanche to the country’s President 
as well as state governors to squander billions of naira in state allocations without 
scrutiny, accountability and without providing ‘security’ for anyone save the 
executive’s pockets and/or their bank accounts. Just last week, The Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission EFCC filed a charge against Bayelsa State‘s 
Commissioner for Finance, Dr. Charles Osuala, the state‘s Accountant General, 
Mr. Francis Okokuro, the state‘s Director of Treasury, Abot Clinton and the 
Director of Finance, Anthony Howells for allegedly stealing N2 billion belonging 
to the state and over an alleged N500million bribe. The Commissioner for 
Finance managed to escape arrest by the whiskers when operatives of the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) arrested the others. In an 
interview with the AIT from his hideout, The Bayelsa State‘s Commissioner for 
Finance, said the N500 million naira said to be misappropriated is part of the 
Security vote spent on security in the Niger Delta. The Security vote has thus 
become an omnibus heading under which state money is siphoned with no 
questions asked.’75 
Despite the fact that there is no clear basis for allocating such huge sums as security 
votes, the tendency seems to be that such security votes are constantly on the increase. 
The extent of the security vote abuse in Abia State was played out recently on national 
media. Abia State is arguably the most insecure state in the country. Kidnapping and 
lawlessness thrive in the state. Its commercial nerve centre, Aba, has been described 
                                                 
 
74 See Nigerian Compass Newspaper, July 28, 2010.  
 
75 Elombah, (2010a).  
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publicly by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as a “no go area”. This is 
so despite the huge amounts of money set aside in the state budget yearly as security 
vote. Recently, for instance, the Abia Elders Forum, a political pressure group alleged 
that the Governor was planning to increase his security vote from N400 million to 
N700 million through the State House of Assembly. The group further asserted that at 
N700 million  per month, the Governor would be pocketing a princely N8.4 billion 
per annum as security vote for which he is not accountable to anyone. The Group 
further asserted that: “It was scandalous enough that he has been taking out N400 
million per month since he came into office as security vote. Raising the vote to N700 
million at a time the state’s economy has completely collapsed…. indicates a tragic 
intention to destroy the state’s economic base.”76  
 
The Deputy Speaker and House Committee Chairman on Information, Hon. 
Chinedum Elechi however swiftly denied the claim and clarified the position in a 
press conference. According to him:  
 
the total sum of N8 billion was appropriated for this purpose in the 2010 budget 
which is still undergoing public hearing. He explained that contrary to rumours 
the House has not approved N700 million per month as governor's security vote 
but N667 million assuming the 2010 budget estimate was to be passed without 
any alteration representing a monthly increment of N113 million above N554 
million per month the governor received in 2009 fiscal year. "This House has not 
approved the 2010 budget estimate as public hearing is still going on. We need to 
put paid to the rumour that the House has passed N700 million for the governor. 
Assuming it is passed the way it is in the budget estimate, it is only going to be 
N667 million and not N700 million," he explained.77 
 
Assuming that the Deputy Speaker is correct, the magnitude of this amount is perhaps 
best brought out in comparative perspective. The total amount budgeted for recurrent 
expenditure for the 2010 fiscal year was N31.1 billion while N30 billion was 
budgeted for capital expenditure.78 In other words, the N6.65 billion security vote 
(2009 figures) constituted more than 10 percent of the entire budget for the state. 
 
                                                 
76 Quoted in Vanguard, January 19, 2010.  
 
77 Quoted in Daily Champion, January 28, 2010.   
 
78 See Vanguard Newspaper, December 11, 2008.  
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In Edo State, the story is not much different. In 2009, for instance, the Speaker of the 
State House of Assembly, Hon Zakawanu Garuba, publicly accused the State 
Governor, Adams Oshimole of exploiting the security vote to fleece the state. 
According to the speaker, "Between November 12th to 31st December, 2008, the 
Comrade Governor of Edo State removed N911 million and put it in his pocket.” This 
was made possible by the fact that “in governance, you do not challenge how security 
vote is spent, the security situation had not improved. In fact, “the killings, 
kidnappings, cultism are on the increase every day. What did he use the money for? 
Nothing.”79 
 
In Oyo State, during the tenure of Governor Ladoja, the security vote was also a major 
contentious issue that threatened the security of the State. It was, for instance, 
generally believed that the continuous demand for a share of the security vote by 
Adedibu, the person widely believed to be behind the emergence of Ladoja as 
Governor, led to the illegal impeachment of Ladoja by legislators loyal to Adedibu.80 
It is perhaps in the light of the above episode that Ladoja has called for the entire issue 
of security vote to be scrapped. Along these lines, it has been reported thus:  
Ladoja revealed that he was seriously pressurized by some prominent politicians 
in the state to share the security votes when he was the governor. He said Peoples 
Democratic Party (PDP) chieftain and strongman of Ibadan politics, Lamidi 
Adedibu, was constantly on his neck, demanding their own portion of the vote. 
"Federal Government should abolish the idea of allocating security votes to state 
governors. It breeds corruption and put governors under unnecessary pressure 
from some people. "The people already know that governors are not bound to 
account for the way they spend the security votes so they are often encouraged to 
share the money. "Let me tell you, it was not only Adedibu that was harassing me 
                                                 
79 The Governor’s defence is rather interesting. In a swift reaction, the Special Adviser to the Governor 
on Public Affairs and Strategy, Mr. Eric Osagie, described the allegations as baseless and unfounded. 
He asserted that Oshiomhole administration has been very prudent in the management of the state's 
scarce resources. He further argued that it was strange that no eyebrow was raised when the former 
administration of Professor Oserheimen Osunbor spent over N1billion as security vote just for one 
month. He then challenged the Speaker to “provide incontrovertible evidence that money was 
mismanaged or mis-spent. In the absence of that, the accusation is just another storm in a tea cup" (See 
ThisDay, March 30, 2009).  
 
80 Abdul-Jelil (Undated, p.22). This impeachment was later reversed by a competent court and Ladoja 
was reinstated as Governor.  
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over the security money. You may not believe it, some Obas and prominent 
people do come around and say, please, give us part of the security funds."81 
In Anambra State, the situation is also not much different. Last year, it was reported 
that Governor Peter Obi was getting N350 million in security vote monthly. This 
claim was however swiftly dismissed by an aide to the governor who made it explicit 
that the governor’s monthly security vote was N250 million.82 Three official vehicles 
from the Governor’s Office were subsequently intercepted by the Nigerian Police 
Force in Lagos carrying N250 million in cash. It was at the time widely alleged that 
this was the usual tactics used by Governor Peter Obi to launder his monthly security 
votes.83 Peter Obi however denied any link to the money and asked the Police to 
investigate. Up till now, nothing has been heard publicly about the outcome of the 
investigations. Only the police can therefore tell about the whereabouts of the 
recovered money.  
 
The abuse of security votes has however not been limited to the state and federal 
levels. Even chairmen of Local Government Areas, are routinely allocated security 
votes which they abuse. This is so despite the general belief that Local Government 
Areas have little independent security needs and the widespread view that it is not 
really an independent tier of government in the country.84 Arguably the best known 
                                                 
81 Daily Independent, 12 November 2007. In an interview with the Vanguard Newspaper published on 
November 26, 2006, Ladoja specifically claimed that Adedibu wanted 25% of the N65million monthly 
security vote. This was corroborated by Adedibu who asserted that: “He (Ladoja) was collecting N65 
million as security vote every month. You know that governors don’t account for security vote. He was 
to give me N15 million of that every month. He reneged. Later, it was reduced to N10 million. Yet he 
did not give me” (quoted in Abdul-Jelil, Undated, p.23). Adedibu later denied that he ever made such 
demands.    
82 Elombah (2010a).  
83 It was for instance asserted thus: “Governor Peter Obi engages in the monthly act of carting away 
Anambra's security votes every month…. Governor’s cars are always ‘serviced’ monthly either in 
Lagos, Abuja or Port Harcourt, only at month-ends, depending on where Ndibe Obi - a relation of the 
governor, is available to receive the security vote from Awka. On one occasion the driver that led the 
operation, Peter’s own driver, Thompson took $120,000 in cash on one money laundry trip.  Peter 
could not sack him; rather he dropped Thompson to the pool as sacking Thompson would have led to 
him squealing on his boss” (Elombah, 2010a). Please mote that under section 1 of the Nigerian Money 
Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004, no person or corporation or organisation is allowed to make or 
accept cash payments of a sum in excess of N500,000.00 or its equivalent in the case of an individual, 
and N2,000,000.00 or its equivalent in the case of a corporation, unless such cash payment or 
acceptance is undertaken through a financial institution. 
84 “Bisi Akande, the Former Governor of Osun State has, for instance, argued that: “Local governments 
are NOT and can NOT be a tier of government in a Federal arrangement. They are under the authority 
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study of such abuses was that conducted by Human Rights Watch in 2007. This study 
focused on the Local Government Areas in Rivers State. According to the report:  
  
The security vote is one of the most opaque items in any local government 
budget, and it is also typically one of the largest single allocations….According 
to a Commission of Inquiry convened in 2006, Khana local government’s chair 
has received an average of N60 million ($461,000) annually for his security 
vote… Tai local government’s chair had a security vote of N40 million  
($300,000) in 2006. Opobo/Nkoro local government’s security vote was N36 
million ($280,000) in 2006….  In each of these cases, the security votes exceeded 
the total capital budgets for either health or education…. Human Rights Watch 
found that in some LGAs much of the total set aside for security votes was stolen 
outright or channeled into improper forms of patronage.85 
 
 
The report also enhances our appreciation of the lack of oversight by the councillors 
in the budgeting for such outrageous allocations by the chairmen of local government 
areas. This is no doubt because such councillors are also allowed generous salaries 
and allowances of their own. In one of the local government areas investigated by the 
Human Rights Watch, for instance, “more than 30 percent of the entire local 
government budget was set aside for salaries and overhead expenses for the offices of 
the chairman and the legislative council.”86  
 
Conclusion 
 
There is widespread belief that the appropriation of security votes in Nigeria is 
unconstitutional and thus illegal.87 This is not correct. This is because under the 
                                                                                                                                            
of the respective states. The Local Government is an administrating unit of the federating units (i.e. the 
states) mainly to serve as development points between the local people and the federating units. On the 
other hand, the State is NOT and must NOT be seen as an agent of the Federal Government. It is a co-
ordinate government to the Federal Government. Each is superior to the other only in respect of the 
functions allotted to it by the Constitution” (Akande, 2001, pp. 2-3), For an indepth analysis in support 
of this position, see Achara (2003).   
 
85 Human Rights Watch (2007, pp.32-33).   
 
86 Human Rights Watch (2007, p.33).   
 
87 This view is no doubt very popular. A prominent national newspaper recently reported thus: “Human 
rights lawyer, Mr. Bamidele Aturu, described security vote as an illegality and irresponsibility on the 
part of the country's leaders. He condemned the governors for appropriating security votes to 
themselves even when they know that it is unconstitutional. He also argued that the governors who 
indulge in security votes rob the society of essential resources. "Security vote is illegal and the height 
of irresponsibility on the part of our political elite. There is no part of our laws that allows them to 
collect security votes. It is armed robbery. I am ashamed to see that governors squander the country's 
resources in the name of security votes yet the people keep quiet. This shows that they can take 
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Nigerian Constitution, the executive is entrusted with the responsibility of preparing a 
budget which is then sent to the legislature for ratification. The fact that large amounts 
of money are routinely being frivolously budgeted and expended in the name of 
security vote does not make it an illegal practice. The act of approving any sum 
allocated to such a heading, covert or overt, legalizes the concept. The Nigerian 
Constitution also vests in the legislature the powers to oversee the audit of all 
accounts of government. The fact that the legislature has failed to do this in the past, 
either because of ignorance or compromise, does not make the concept of security 
votes illegal. The fundamental problem however is the fact that security votes in 
Nigeria have little to do with security. It is to a great extent used as an avenue by 
rulers to legitimize stealing from the public purse. This is simply part of the wider 
problem of lack of accountability in government at all levels in the country. The 
reason for this is the warped nature of the agency relationship in the structure of 
government in the country. Although Nigerian citizens (electorate) are supposed to be 
the principal in this relationship, widespread abuse of the electoral process has 
ensured that they have little power over their agents (“elected officials”). Under such 
scenario, there is enormous incentive for the agents to use their vast wealth, 
sometimes acquired through security votes, to secure their position.88 The new 
Nigerian President: Goodluck Jonathan has, since assuming office, consistently 
pledged that his administration will restore the power of the principal in the Nigerian 
governance process by ensuring that all votes count in the 2011 elections.89 Unless 
this is done, the abuse of power and lack of accountability by both the legislature and 
                                                                                                                                            
anything." On his part, another lawyer, Mr. Festus Keyamo, said security vote is illegal and 
unconstitutional. "There is nothing like security vote in our appropriation laws and there is no part of 
our laws that allows governors to appropriate security votes to themselves. It is simply unconstitutional, 
armed robbery among the political elite," he said”(Thisday, April 6, 2010). . 
88 Recently, the former governor of Cross River State, Donald Duke described vividly how the security 
vote is normally used to subvert free and fair elections in the states (See Guardian Newspaper, July 17, 
2010).  
89 More recently, the President has expressed reservations about the possibility of doing this without 
reversing the rentier nature of the Nigerian state which has essentially been facilitated by the country’s 
overdependence on its oil revenue. According to the President: “it would be difficult to form a viable 
citizenry that could call government to account for its stewardship if the economy depends solely on oil 
revenue.” He further stated that “Nigerians must ensure prompt payment of their taxes to be able to 
stand tall and demand accountability from government in the management of revenues” (Quoted in 
ThisDay, October 11, 2010).   
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the executive, which has resulted in this security vote malpractice, will be difficult to 
curtail.  
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